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ABSTRACT
With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are contin-
uously seeking privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and
Tor were introduced to provide anonymity for online transactions
and Web browsing. Due to its pseudonymity model, Bitcoin lacks
retroactive operational security, which means historical pieces of
information could be used to identify a certain user. We investigate
the feasibility of deanonymizing users of Tor hidden services who
rely on Bitcoin as a payment method by exploiting public informa-
tion leaked from online social networks, the Blockchain, and onion
websites. This, for example, allows an adversary to link a user with
@alice Twitter address to a Tor hidden service with private.onion
address by finding at least one past transaction in the Blockchain
that involves their publicly declared Bitcoin addresses.
To demonstrate the feasibility of this deanonymization attack,
we carried out a real-world experiment simulating a passive, lim-
ited adversary. We crawled 1.5K hidden services and collected 88
unique Bitcoin addresses. We then crawled 5B tweets and 1M Bit-
coinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique Bitcoin
addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an
online identity along with its public profile information. By ana-
lyzing the transactions in the Blockchain, we were able to link 125
unique users to 20 Tor hidden services, including sensitive ones,
such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case
studies in detail to demonstrate the implications of the resulting
information leakage on user anonymity. In particular, we confirm
that Bitcoin addresses should always be considered exploitable, as
they can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is espe-
cially important for Tor hidden service users who actively seek and
expect privacy and anonymity.
1 INTRODUCTION
Anonymity and privacy over the Internet are becoming more criti-
cal than ever. For that, many solutions are being deployed to im-
prove the anonymity of users while making online transaction or
browsing the web. The most famous of these solutions are the de-
centralized cryptocurrencies and Tor anonymity network. One of
the early examples is the Bitcoin network [29], which provides users
with the ability to perform online transactions "pseudonymously".
Due to its popularity, more than 100K merchants worldwide accept
Bitcoin payments [11]. One of the reasons of Bitcoin’s popular-
ity is its presumed anonymity. Tor [14] is the most widely used
anonymous communication network with millions of daily active
users [31]. In addition to client-side privacy and anonymity, Tor
also enables server-side anonymity through the design of hidden
services. The goal of hidden services is to safely enable online free-
dom, anticensorship, and end-to-end anonymity and security [12].
Indeed, for those reasons, hidden services are being operated by
whistleblowing websites such as WikiLeaks,1 search engines such
as DuckDuckGo,2 and online social networks such as Facebook.3
Hidden services have also become a breeding ground for Dark Web
vendors, such as Silk Road [9] and Agora [39], which offer illicit
merchandise and services [4, 27].
As discussed by Vincent and Johan [26], Tor and Bitcoin repre-
sent the main components needed to achieve anonymous online
purchases with exhaustive operational security. In this context, op-
erational security is the process of protecting individual pieces of
information that could be used to identify a user. Unfortunately, Bit-
coin lacks retroactive operational security due to its pseudonymity
model [29]. This model has an important limitation because of the
linkability of Bitcoin transactions that are stored in the Blockchain
and their public availability.
Problem. Due to potential information leakage, using Bitcoin as a
payment method is a serious threat to the anonymity of Tor hidden
services and their users. Yet, Bitcoin is the most popular choice for
these services for accepting donations or selling merchandise [4].
Moore and Rid [27] studied how hidden services are used in prac-
tice, and noted that Bitcoin was the dominant choice for accepting
payments for these services. Although multiple studies [15, 16, 25]
demonstrated that Bitcoin transactions are not as anonymous as
previously thought, Bitcoin remains the most popular digital cur-
rency on the Dark Web [8], and many users still choose to use it
despite its false sense of anonymity. Biryukov et al. [3] showed that
even if users use Bitcoin over an anonymity network such as Tor,
they are still vulnerable to deanonymization andman-in-the-middle
attacks at the network level. While previous studies analyze the
vulnerabilities that result from using Bitcoin over Tor [3], mostly
at the network level, we provide the first study that focuses on
the application level, shedding light on an exploitable information
leakage resulting from correlating public profiles of online social
network users with Bitcoin transactions and onion websites.
Hidden service users are one class of Bitcoin userswhose anonymity
is particularly important. Hidden service operators and users are
actively seeking to maintain their anonymity. However, those users
are under the risk of deanonymization when they reveal their Bit-
coin addresses. By studying the transactions associated with these
addresses, a significant amount of information can be leaked and
1https://wikileaks.com
2https://duckduckgo.com
3https://facebook.com
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used to collect sensitive information about hidden services and
their customers, where a user can be linked to a hidden service.
In this paper, we seek to understand the privacy risk associated
with using Bitcoin as a payment method by Tor hidden services.
That is, we show how using Bitcoin leaks public information that
can be exploited to deanonymize Tor hidden service users. In par-
ticular, we demonstrate the feasibility of linking a user with @alice
social network profile to a Tor hidden service with private.onion
address. We note that this research has been carefully revised and
approved by our institution’s IRB board, and it does not put users at
any risk other than what they are currently exposed to (Section 3.3).
We also discuss a number of countermeasures that are designed to
protect and improve user privacy and anonymity (Section 4.4).
Approach. By browsing onion landing pages of various hidden
services, we observed that it is possible to extract their payment Bit-
coin addresses from static HTML content. Accordingly, we crawled
1.5K hidden service pages and created a dataset of 88 Bitcoin ad-
dresses operated by those hidden services, including two ransomware
addresses. We also crawled online social networks for public Bit-
coin addresses, namely, Twitter4 and the BitcoinTalk forum.5 Out
of 5B tweets and 1M forum pages, we created two datasets of 4.1K
and 41K Bitcoin addresses, respectively. Each address in these user
datasets is associated with an online identity and its corresponding
public profile information (Section 3.4).
Using a clustering heuristic proposed by Meiklejohn et al. [25],
we performed a wallet-closure analysis that allowed us to expand
the collected Bitcoin addresses per user. In other words, for each
address in the collected user datasets, we identified other addresses
belonging to the same user who owns the address. This closure anal-
ysis approximates a user’s wallet, which is the set of addresses that
are controlled by the user, and thereby increase the number of iden-
tified links between users and hidden services. One problem with
closure analysis is that the closure can over-approximate the size of
the wallet, as a consequence of mixing [23] and CoinJoin [40] ser-
vices. Therefore, we excluded closures that have common addresses
from the analysis. This ensures that users are not double-counted
and reported results are lower-bound estimate, as each remain-
ing closure represents a subset of a wallet whose addresses are
controlled by a unique user (Section 3.5).
After wallet-closure analysis, we used the datasets to analyze
the transactions in the Blockchain. In particular, we searched for
transactions between user and hidden service addresses in order
to identify links between them. This enabled us to associate users,
or online identities, with hidden services and access their transac-
tion history. To demonstrate the impact of linking, we traced and
described two case studies showing that Bitcoin addresses can be
used to deanonymize users retroactively, starting from May, 2010.
It is important to highlight that deanonymization depends solely
on information leaked from public data sources. Finally, to gain
insights into the economic activity of the linked hidden services,
we analyzed the corresponding transaction history, focusing on
number of transactions, the amount of money being exchanged,
and the lifetime of these hidden services (Section 3.6).
4https://twitter.com
5https://bitcointalk.org
Results. With wallet-closure analysis, we were able to expand
the datasets from 45.2K Bitcoin addresses to more than 19.1M, with
an average of 425 addresses per user. Using transaction analysis,
we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 Tor sensitive hidden
services, such as WikiLeaks, Silk Road, and The Pirate Bay.6 The
case studies unmasked multiple users of The Pirate Bay hidden
service, along with their personally identifiable information (PII),
such as name, gender, age, and location.7 We also found that users
from multiple countries and different ages had links with the Silk
Road address in our hidden service dataset. One of the users, for
example, is a teenager who has many social network accounts
showing his real identity.
The economic activity analysis of the linked hidden services
shows that WikiLeaks is the highest receiver of payments in terms
of volume, with 25.6K transactions. In terms of the amount of in-
coming payments, however, the Silk Road tops the list with more
than 29.6K Bitcoins received on its address.8 We observed that the
money flowing in and out of hidden service addresses is nearly the
same. This suggests that these services do not keep their Bitcoins on
the address they use for receiving payments, but rather distribute
the coins to other addresses instead. Finally, from the last transac-
tion dates on the addresses, we found that only eight out of the 20
linked hidden services are inactive in 2017. This, however, does not
mean the inactive services stopped making Bitcoin transactions, as
they might have used different addresses that we do not know.
Contributions. This paper shows the implications of Bitcoin’s
pseudonymity model, which lacks retroactive operational security,
on Tor hidden service users. Our contributions are the following:
(1) A method that links online user identities with Tor hidden
services through Bitcoin transactions analysis. The method
improves linking results by using closure analysis techniques
and by significantly eliminating the noise from mixing and
CoinJoin services.
(2) The first real-world experiment that shows the feasibility
of deanonymizing Tor hidden service users by exploiting
information leakage resulting from correlating public data
sources, namely, online social networks, the Bitcoin Blockchain,
and Tor hidden services.
(3) An economic activity analysis of 20 hidden services that
were used by linked users. This includes statistics on their
transaction volume, flow of money, and lifetime.
2 BACKGROUND
We now present the necessary background on Bitcoin and Tor.
2.1 Bitcoin
Bitcoin [29] is a decentralized digital crypto-currency systemwhich
eliminates the need for a central bank authority to manage the trans-
fer of funds. The Bitcoin network is maintained by a peer-to-peer
network of miners who validate transactions without relaying on
trust. Due to its popularity, more than 100K merchants worldwide
6https://thepiratebay.org
7In accordance with our IRB board’s guidelines, we have removed the PII of these
users, as the linked hidden services are considered illegal in their countries.
8As of Dec 2017, this amount of Bitcoins equals more than 580 million USD.
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accept Bitcoin payments [11]. One of the reasons of Bitcoin’s popu-
larity is its presumed anonymity. The identities of users in Bitcoin
are hidden using pseudonyms which are used as addresses to per-
form transactions. A Bitcoin address is a 160-bit hash of a public key
generated by a digital signature algorithm. The set of public/private
keys that are owned by a user is called a wallet. Private keys are
used to sign inputs of transactions as a proof of ownership.
2.1.1 Transactions. Alice makes a payment to Bob by creating a
new transaction. She uses one or more Bitcoin addresses that she
controls as inputs. She also includes the amount to be transferred,
and chooses Bob’s address(es) as a transaction output. To protect
the transaction, she signs it using her private key(s), and then
broadcasts it to the whole network. In order to verify transactions,
and be rewarded with new generated coins, miners collect the
broadcast transactions, embed them in a well-defined data structure
called a block, and then attempt to solve a hashing computational
puzzle involving the block. When the block is solved, it is attached
to the Blockchain, which is a hash-chain that maintains all solved
blocks, and thereby all embedded transactions ever created and
verified in the Bitcoin network.
The Blockchain is publicly maintained and can be downloaded
over the Internet, Bitcoin’s original client, or explored using cen-
tralized servers, such as Blockchain Info.9 Every transaction in
the Blockchain has a list of inputs and outputs, where each in-
cludes addresses that were used in the transaction and the amount
of coins spent in that transaction. Transactions downloaded from
Blockchain Info include more information, such as the relay IP ad-
dress and the transaction timestamp that records the time at which
the transaction was made.
2.1.2 Anonymity. While transactions in Bitcoin are presumed to
be anonymous, linkability between addresses is possible due the
nature of the Blockchain [29]. For example, one can verify if Alice
and Bob have a transaction between them. Furthermore, if Alice
owns multiple addresses, one may be able to link them as belonging
to the same person.
Meiklejohn et al. [25] observed that two Bitcoin addresses,A and
B, belong to the same user if bothA and B have been used as inputs
for the same transaction, or B receives, as an output, the unspent
change of a transaction where A is used as input. The authors
used this observation to define a heuristic for mapping multiple
addresses to an entity representing a unique user. Specifically, the
heuristic is based on the idea that since the private keys of the
user are used to sign the inputs A and B, then both A and B are
controlled by the same person. As the addresses or the underlying
public/private keys that are owned by a user represents a wallet,
the heuristic tries to induce the wallet of a user given a subset
of the addresses in the wallet. The authors also define a second
heuristic based on another observation. When an address is used
as an input in a transaction, all of its associated Bitcoins have to
be spent at once. If those coins exceed what the sender wants to
spend, then the sender has to reference two outputs, one to the
receiver with the intended amount, and another for the change. The
sender typically controls the change address within the transaction.
9https://blockchain.info
Both heuristics represent wallet-closure techniques that are used
for Bitcoin transaction analysis.
It is important to note that wallet-closure techniques are noisy
and can result in addresses that do not belong to the same user
or wallet. One reason for this is the use of mixing [23] and Coin-
Join [40] services. Given a set of input addresses of multiple users,
these services generate a sequence of transactions that effectively
mixes the coins to enhance anonymity. In this work, we modify the
first wallet-closure technique to handle Bitcoin mixing for transac-
tion analysis, as described in Section 3.5.
2.2 Tor Hidden Services
Tor [14] is the most widely used anonymous communication net-
work available online. Tor enables server-side anonymity through
the design of hidden services, also known as onion services. To
achieve their anonymity goal, a hidden service client and operator
establish a communication tunnel, known as a circuit, between each
other over multiple intermediate routers. Anonymity is maintained
as long as the intermediate routers at the two ends of the tunnel are
not controlled by an adversary who can use time or traffic analysis
to link the source to the destination. Hidden services have also
been subjected to active attacks in the wild [13, 24]. For these rea-
sons, the Tor project is actively working on addressing the security
weaknesses of hidden services [30].
To ensure transaction anonymity, Bitcoin has become the most
popular choice by Tor hidden services for accepting donations or
selling merchandise [4]. Unfortunately, this has contributed to the
rise of illegal hidden services, such as Silk Road and Agora, which
offer illicit merchandises and services [4, 9, 27, 39].
3 APPROACH AND EXPERIMENT
While the goal of using Bitcoin for Tor hidden services is to pro-
vide transaction and browsing anonymity, we show that this usage
typically leaks information that can be used to deanonymize hid-
den service users. In particular, the adversary can link users, who
publicly share their Bitcoin addresses on online social networks,
with hidden services, which publicly share their Bitcoin addresses
on onion landing pages. This is achieved by inspecting historical
transactions involving these two addresses in the Blockchain. In
doing so, the adversary only relies on data that is publicly available.
3.1 Overview
To illustrate the deanonymization attack, let us consider Alice, a
privacy-savvy user who uses Tor, in the following scenario:
(1) Alice uses a browser and creates an online identity @alice
with a public profile on social network public.com.
(2) Alice uses @alice to make a public post asking for donations
on Bitcoin address A.
(3) Alice receives donations through a number of Bitcoin trans-
actions, where A is used as an output address.
(4) Alice uses Tor browser to visit hidden service private.onion
that has public Bitcoin address P .
(5) Alice makes a payment A→ P to private.onion using A as
an input address and P as an output address.
While steps 1–3 involve non-anonymous web browsing and pub-
lic activities, Alice has some expectations of privacy and anonymity
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in steps 4–5, given that she is using Tor and Bitcoin. Step 5, however,
leaks a piece of information, the transaction A→ P in particular,
that can be used by an adversary, Trudy, to link @alice to pri-
vate.onion, as follows:
(1) Trudy crawls public.com on regular basis, storing public user
profiles and posts.
(2) Trudy crawls hidden services on regular basis, storing acces-
sible onion pages.
(3) Trudy parses crawled data on regular basis, searching for
Bitcoin addresses.
(4) Trudy parses the blockchain on regular basis, searching for
transactions between user and hidden service addresses.
(5) Trudy finds Bitcoin addressA on public.com, associated with
online identity @alice.
(6) Trudy finds Bitcoin address P on private.onion.
(7) Trudy finds transactionA→ P and accordingly links @alice
to private.onion.
Unknown to Alice, Trudy can effectively deanonymize Alice’s
identity and link her to activities on private.onion using steps 1–7.
More importantly, this attack vector is feasible retroactively in the
future, starting from the time of the transaction A→ P .
3.2 Adversary Model
We assume a passive, limited adversary. The adversary has access to
or is capable of collecting Bitcoin addresses of Tor hidden services
and their users. This attacker does not need to control network
resources, but can extract publicly accessible information from on-
line social networks, the Blockchain, and onion pages. Obtaining
Bitcoin addresses of users can be either targeted or non-targeted,
depending on the attack scenario. For the earlier scenario, the adver-
sary can use social engineering or exploit contextual metadata. For
example, if Trudy knows that Alice booked a ticket on Expedia10
at a certain time with a certain amount of coins, Trudy can easily
deduce Alice’s Bitcoin address from the Blockchain. For the latter
scenario, the adversary can crawl and parse public data sources for
Bitcoin addresses and associated identities on a large scale.
We focus on the second, non-targeted attack scenario and show
that an adversary can deanonymize hidden service users by corre-
lating public data from online social networks, the Blockchain, and
Tor hidden services.
3.3 Ethical Considerations
The deanonymization presented in this work depends on correlating
public Bitcoin addresses of users with the transactions revealed
by the Blockchain. Many prior studies performed similar analyses
based on crawled public Bitcoin addresses [16, 25, 32]. While our
study narrows down this analysis to the scope of hidden services
and their users, we stress that even the Bitcoin addresses of hidden
services were readily available on their onion landing pages. We did
not try to obtain Bitcoin addresses of hidden services that require
authentication, payment, or exchange of emails.
We believe the data collected and used herein is easily available
to adversaries. In this research, in addition to the Blockchain and
10https://www.expedia.com
onion landing pages, we used data available from two online so-
cial networks, namely, Twitter and the BitcoinTalk forum. A web
search engine, such as Google,11 or any other organization that
has access to a significantly larger amount of data could perform
the analysis on a larger scale, and potentially exploit a significantly
larger amount of leaked information about users. Ignoring the exis-
tence of the data, or the security implications of using Bitcoin as a
payment method for hidden services, can leave both the users and
the security community unaware of the involved privacy leaks.
To this end, we have consulted and received the approval of our
institution’s IRB board to conduct our experiment. We would like
to highlight that our research does not put users at any additional
risk, but rather expose the existing one. This is important because
once users become vulnerable to this deanonymization attack, as
described in Section 3.1, they stay vulnerable even after they switch
to a more secure payment method or stop using the service. As part
of our personal and institutional code of ethics, we have reached
out to vulnerable users in our datasets and informed them about
this threat and possible remedies. We also posted an anonymous
notice on BitcoinTalk forum.12 In Section 4.4, we discuss a number
of countermeasures that are designed to protect and improve user
privacy and anonymity.
3.4 Data Collection
We now describe how we collected public Bitcoin addresses and
online identities of Tor hidden services and Bitcoin users.13
3.4.1 Hidden Services. Tor hidden services are not indexed by nor-
mal search engines, but can be found using indexing services such
as Ahmia,14 which is accessible from the normal Web. Other search
engines are available but require a Tor browser in order to access
them. These search engines are used to access the onion landing
pages, or the websites, of many hidden services. Typically, hidden
services publish their Bitcoin addresses on their landing pages for
receiving payments. These addresses can be collected by simply
downloading these pages and searching for Bitcoin addresses us-
ing regular expressions. As a Bitcoin address is a base-58 encoded
identifier of 26–35 alphanumeric characters, beginning with the
number 1 or 3, we used the following regex:
*[13][a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{25,34}
With the goal of collecting long-term hidden service addresses,
we started expanding the dataset in mid 2015. Over time, however,
we found that fewer hidden services publicly exposed their Bitcoin
addresses on their onion pages, resorting to online wallets or other
crypto-currencies, possibly due to the increasing awareness of Bit-
coin’s privacy issues (Section 4). Therefore, our analysis focuses
on the time window when publishing long-term Bitcoin addresses
was a common practice. We note that the deanonymization attack
is feasible using historic data that is publicly available since the
inception of Bitcoin in 2010 up until now.
In our experiment, we first compiled a list of onion addresses
from Ahmia. We then downloaded the landing pages of more than
1.5K hidden services. While our goal was to automate the process of
11https://google.com
12https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=2602885
13The resulting datasets are available per request to interested researchers.
14https://ahmia.fi
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Date collected # addresses
Label (dd/mm/yyyy) # users Original Expanded
hiddenServices 27/01/2016 88 88 –
twitterUsers 30/12/2014 4,183 4,183 623,189
forumUsers 26/10/2016 40,970 40,970 19,213,141
Table 1: Dataset summary of collected Bitcoin addresses
collecting Bitcoin addresses, many of the onion addresses listed by
Ahmia were unavailable or offline when we ran the scripts on Jan
27, 2016. A simple regex search on the landing pages allowed us to
extract a small number of Bitcoin addresses, less than 20 addresses.
Furthermore, by browsing various hidden services, we were
able to extract more addresses. We also observed that many ser-
vices did not expose their Bitcoin addresses on their landing pages,
and would require users to attempt purchasing items before a Bit-
coin address is shown to the user.15 In addition, we included two
known ransomware addresses that are published on the Web and
the Blockchain.16 Ransomware is a malware category that limits the
access of users to their files by encrypting them [19]. Ransomware
requires victims to pay in order to get access to the decryption keys.
To remain anonymous, ransomware requires victims to pay through
the Bitcoin network. Ransomware lockers are known to use Tor
hidden services as a place to hide their malicious activities [20].
Our automated and manual searching resulted in a total of 105
Bitcoin addresses. We verified that those addresses were active
by downloading their transactions. We removed all addresses that
contained no transactions or had very low amount of Bitcoins,
less than 0.00001B, and are likely to be inactive. This resulted in
88 unique Bitcoin addresses which represent the hiddenServices
dataset, as summarized in Table 1.
While the number we ended up with seem relatively small com-
pared to the total number of hidden services, our goal here is to
show the feasibility of linking hidden services to their users using
only public information. As described in Section 3.2, an adversary
that has a wider access to resources, or actively interact with hid-
den services, is expected to collect a significantly larger number of
addresses.
3.4.2 Users. Bitcoin users often post their addresses on online
social networks for different purposes, such as receiving donations,
offering services, or showing that they are part of the community.
Public Bitcoin addresses exposed online could potentially put these
users at the risk of transactions history tracing and linkage. Not
only do users reveal their public Bitcoin addresses, but they also
reveal personal information representing their online identities,
such as contact information, gender, age, and location, depending
on the social network used.
Bitcoin addresses and the associated online identities of users
can be collected by crawling and parsing their user profiles or by
using the native APIs provided by the social network itself. In our
experiment, we collected the addresses and identities of users of
15Services we manually visited offered variety of different content ranging from dark
markets (e.g. drug, stolen card, and arms) to services such as WikiLeaks.
16https://blockchain.info/address/1AEoiHY23fbBn8QiJ5y6oAjrhRY1Fb85uc
two online social networks, specifically, Twitter and the BitcoinTalk
forum, as summarized in Table 1. We note that there is a one-one
mapping between an address and its associated online identity.
Twitter. We used Twitter Decahose stream data [38] that we pre-
viously collected from Dec 11, 2013 to Dec 30, 2014. Decahose pro-
vides a 10% realtime random sampling of all public tweets through
a streaming connection. The reason we chose this dataset is be-
cause we wanted to find Bitcoin addresses for Twitter users, which
coincide with our hidden services’ Bitcoin addresses. Recall that
prior to 2016, it was more common for users and hidden services
to share their long-term addresses. Overall, data collection resulted
in 10TB of JSON-formatted files representing 5 billion tweets. In
addition to its textual content, each tweet has the public profile
information of its author, which sometimes contains the author’s
Bitcoin address. To extract tweets that contain Bitcoin addresses,
we scanned the whole dataset and kept the tweets that matched
the regex described in Section 3.4.1, resulting in 509,173 tweets.
Next, we ran another pass on the matched tweets to group them
into unique Bitcoin addresses. From 509,173 matched tweets, we
found 4,183 unique addresses and identities, where an address of
an identity appeared in 165 different tweets, on average. We refer
to this list of addresses as the twitterUsers dataset.
Forum. BitcoinTalk is one of the most popular Bitcoin forums
with more than 900K users who exchange interests, technical ex-
pertise, and experiences in the development of the Bitcoin software.
The forum also has several different sections for coin mining, tech-
nical support, and the economy of Bitcoin. It is the first forum of
its kind that discusses topics related to Bitcoin and has reached
its billionth post in Jul, 2012. As of Nov 2017, the forum contained
around 2.5 billion posts. Based on its popularity, we sought to use
it as a resource to extract public addresses of Bitcoin users.
In our experiment, we crawled and parsed 900K user profiles
by retrieving each profile page using its URL, where each page
is indexed by a unique user identifier that starts from 1. Overall,
the crawling resulted in 22 GB of unparsed user profiles in HTML
format. Having the profiles downloaded, we parsed them searching
for Bitcoin addresses using the regex described in Section 3.4.1,
resulting in 40,970 unique addresses and identities. We refer to this
list of addresses as the forumUsers dataset.
3.5 Wallet-Closure Analysis
The goal of wallet-closure analysis is to expand the set of Bitcoin
addresses that are controlled by a user in order to establish a unique
many-one mapping between addresses and an identity. Increasing
the number of Bitcoin addresses per user allows us to identify more
5
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Figure 1: CDFs of closure size before and after cleaning
links between the user and hidden services. Using the first wallet-
closure heuristic originally proposed by Meiklejohn et al. [25], we
define the closure of a Bitcoin address as follows: If addressesA and
B are in a closure, then there exists a transaction where addresses
A and B appear as inputs. The motivation for this is that if two
addresses appear in the same transaction as inputs, then they are
likely to be controlled by the same user, since they are signed by the
private keys of the owner who performed the transaction. However,
this heuristic is noisy when users utilize mixing services or use
CoinJoin transactions, as the mixing process results in closures that
include addresses belonging to multiple identities. Accordingly, one
might end up with closures that have a large number of addresses
that are not mutually exclusive. In other words, there will be some
Bitcoin address that appear in multiple closures.
Mixing services are third party services that receive coins from
one user, mixes the coins with those received from other users,
and then sends back the same amount of coins, albeit shuffled with
different addresses using a number of transactions, to the original
user. CoinJoin, on the other hand, is a peer-to-peer mixing protocol
that achieves a similar goal, but uses a more sophisticated approach.
These services are used to improve the anonymity of transactions
and reduce linkability. In order to eliminate the effect of mixing
services, we perform the following cleaning process: We find all
closures that share at least one address and consequently merge
them, after which we remove all closures that have been merged,
ending up with unique closures that have no intersections and are
mutually-exclusive. While doing so ensures that wallet-closures
which belong tomultiple users are not double counted, it also means
that the resulting number of users that are linked to hidden services
represents a lower-bound estimate of the actual number of user
that can be linked and deanonymized.
In our experiment, after applying wallet-closure, we were able
to expand the twitterUsers dataset by 619,006 additional addresses
for 1,322 users out of the 4,183. The closures were more significant
for the forumUsers dataset, where we were able to add 18,508,012
addresses for 22,843 users out of the 40,970. In total, for the two
datasets, we ended up with 19,172,171 addresses for 45,153 users,
with an average of 425 addresses per user representing the average
closure size. After wallet-closure cleaning, we ended up with 3,640
closures for the twitterUsers dataset, and 23,567 closures for the
forumUsers dataset. These closures under-approximate user wallets,
where each consists of at least one Bitcoin address and is uniquely
mapped to its owner who is a user with an online identity. We use
these closures to link users to hidden services in the next section.
Figure 1 shows the closure size CDFs for both datasets, before
and after the cleaning process. As illustrated in the figure, there is
a significant drop in the size of closures after cleaning; the median
size decreased from 8 addresses to 4 for the twitterUsers dataset,
and from 103 addresses to 5 for the forumUsers dataset. In fact,
more than 90% of the users in both datasets have 6 addresses or less
in their wallets after cleaning. The figure also suggests that a larger
number of BitcoinTalk users utilize mixing services than Twitter
users, as shown by the difference in their before/after distributions.
3.6 Bitcoin Transaction Analysis
We now describe how we linked users to hidden services, give two
deanonymization case studies, and analyze the economic activities
of the linked services.
3.6.1 Linking. In order to establish a link between a user wallet and
a hidden service, we need to search the Blockchain for a transaction
whose input is any of the addresses in the wallet and whose output
is a hidden service address.
In our experiment, we first downloaded the whole Blockchain
using the Bitcoin Core client software [5], which is also responsible
for managing the client’s runtime and transactions. At the time of
the analysis, the size of the Blockchain was over 230GB and it took
nearly two days to download and sync the Blockchain on an average
Internet connection. The Bitcoin Core client does not provide an
easy, native way to access Blockchain transactions. For that, one
can use APIs built on top of Bitcoin Core, such as Bitcore Node [6],
which extends Bitcoin Core and provides additional indexing for
more advanced address queries, and Insight API [7], which is a
RESTful HTTP and web socket API service for Bitcore Node.
Using the Insight API on top of Bitcore Node, we performed the
linking process after wallet-closure as follows: For each address
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# linked users Volume Flow of money (B) Lifetime (dd/mm/yyyy)
Name twitterUsers forumUsers Total (# txs) Incoming Outgoing First tx Last tx # days
WikiLeaks 11 35 46 25,569 4,011.95 4,000.40 14/06/2011 24/07/2017 2,163
Silk Road 4 18 22 979 29,675.86 29,658.80 02/10/2013 24/07/2017 1,321
Internet Archives 3 13 16 2,534 155.55 99.61 09/05/2013 24/07/2017 1,537
Snowden Defense Fund 3 8 11 1,642 201.88 198.38 10/08/2013 15/07/2017 1,370
The Pirate Bay 3 7 10 1,192 76.80 76.78 29/05/2013 08/07/2017 1,151
DarkWallet Mixer 9 1 10 1,084 109.97 92.75 16/04/2014 02/11/2016 932
ProtonMail 1 7 8 2,850 143.17 68.78 17/06/2014 24/07/2017 1,498
OpenStreetMap Donations 0 5 5 440 24.01 24 13/05/2013 13/07/2017 1,522
Darknet Mixer 1 2 3 22,110 306.16 341.48 21/01/2014 24/07/2017 1,645
Liberty Hackers 0 2 2 85 2.79 2.79 10/04/2013 11/07/2017 1,553
Onion Mail 1 0 1 226 84.92 84.92 15/09/2014 30/03/2015 196
Bitcoin Fog 1 0 1 121 10.46 10.46 12/08/2014 09/01/2015 150
Bitmessage Mail 0 1 1 106 2.78 1.37 28/04/2014 16/06/2017 1,145
Secure Tor Messaging 0 1 1 105 12.5 12.5 02/01/2013 05/01/2016 1,098
Ransomware 1 0 1 72 41.15 41.15 28/02/2014 15/08/2014 168
Bitcoin Lottery 0 1 1 33 0.22 0.22 28/02/2014 02/05/2015 428
Libertarian Nuts 0 1 1 23 0.31 0 28/02/2014 24/10/2015 603
Unknown1 1 1 2 42 8.32 8.31 23/06/2014 23/06/2017 1,096
Unknown2 1 0 1 132 4.19 4.18 22/06/2014 01/01/2015 193
Unknown3 0 1 1 39 7.95 7.94 01/05/2014 18/05/2017 1,113
Table 2: Linked hidden services. The three unknown services belong to onion pages that were taken down before we could
manually identify and validate their hidden service provider.
in the hiddenServices dataset, we queried the Blockchain for the
transactions history of that address. This query returns a set of
transactions in which the address appears as either an input or
an output. We then issued the same query for each address in the
twitterUsers and forumUsers datasets. This resulted in two sets
of transactions; one for hidden services and one for users. Finally,
we cross-matched the two sets of transactions; if any address of a
user is found as an input in any transaction where a hidden ser-
vice address appears as an output, then the user has a relationship
with that hidden service, and thus, a link is established. For the
twitterUsers dataset, we were able to link unique 28 users to 14 hid-
den services using 167 transactions. Similarly, for the forumUsers
dataset, we were able to link unique 97 users to 20 hidden services
using 115 transactions. Some of these users were linked to multi-
ple hidden services, and a total of 20 unique hidden services were
linked to users from the two datasets. As suggested by the results,
although Twitter users were smaller in number compared to Bit-
coinTalk users, they were more active and had a larger number of
transactions with hidden services. In fact, some of these users are
“returning customers,” as they have performedmultiple transactions
with the same hidden services.
Table 2 lists the hidden services sorted by how many users were
linked to them. The list is topped by WikiLeaks, a service that pub-
lishes secret information provided by anonymous sources, with
46 linked users. This is followed by the Silk Road, a famous black
market on the Dark Web, with transactions from 22 users whose
input coins have been seized by the FBI. Although the wallet ad-
dress of Silk Road was seized, it is still receiving transactions until
recently. However, from our analysis, we observed that a number of
transactions were performed prior to the seizure. Ranked fifth, The
Pirate Bay, which is known for infringing IP and copyright laws by
facilitating the distribution of protected digital content, was linked
to 10 users. Other services listed in Table 2 include hacking services,
such as Liberty Hackers, mixing services, such as Darknet Mixer,
and various secure mailing providers, such as ProtonMail.
3.6.2 Deanonymization. As linked users have associated online
identities, they could be deanonymized with different levels of cer-
tainty, depending on how much personally identifiable information
they have shared on their social network’s user profiles. We next
focus on two case studies that illustrate this threat in more detail.
It is important to note that we found a number of sensitive details
about these users including location, gender, age and email ad-
dresses. However, due to ethical considerations, we only disclosed
the information that demonstrate the privacy implications of this
type of analysis.
The first case study is of a Pirate Bay hidden service user. The
associated online identity indicates that the user is a middle aged
man from Sweden. This user is particularly interesting because The
Pirate Bay website was founded by a Swedish organization called
Piratbyrån. Furthermore, the original founders of the website were
found guilty in the Swedish court for copyright infringement [33].
Since then, the website has been changing its domain constantly,
and eventually operated as a Tor hidden service. Therefore, the
existing link between this user and The Pirate Bay through recent
transactions could be incriminating.
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In the second case, we focus on the Silk Road hidden service. As
shown in Table 2, there are 22 users that had a link to Silk Road
through transactions with seized Bitcoin addresses. These users
are located across the world in countries such as India, Canada,
and the USA. They include 4 males and 6 females of different ages
that range between 13 and 42 years. The 18 users from the foru-
mUsers dataset were active on BitcoinTalk between 2013 and 2015,
while 3 of them are still active in 2017. As for the 4 users from the
twitterUsers dataset, they posted an average of 45 tweets in 2014.
One particularly interesting user is a young teenager from the USA.
This user has been a registered BitcoinTalk member since 2013, and
had a transaction with Silk Road in 2013, the takedown year, during
which he was even younger than what his current age shows on his
profile. The associated profile also includes his personal website,
which contains links to his Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube profiles.
3.6.3 Economic Activity. In order to gain insights about the eco-
nomic activities of the linked hidden services, we analyzed all of
their transactions in the Blockchain. In our experiment, for each
service, we collected information about its number of transaction
(i.e., volume), the amount of coins the service has received or sent
(i.e., flow of money), and the timestamps of its first and last transac-
tions (i.e., lifetime). The results are also summarized in Table 2. We
refer the interested reader to Appendix A for the economic activity
analysis of the all hidden services, including the unlinked ones.
Volume. While the list of services is small, our results indicate
that they have been involved in a relatively large number of transac-
tions. For example, WikiLeaks tops the list with 25,569 transactions.
The Darknet Mixer, on the other hand, has a volume of 22.1K trans-
actions that is greater than the remaining services combined. One
explanation for this popularity is that users are actually aware of
the possibility of linking, and try to use mixing services in order to
make traceability more difficult and improve their anonymity.
Money flow. We calculated the total incoming and outgoing Bit-
coins for each hidden service in order to determine how much
money is actually flowing in and out of their addresses. One inter-
esting observation is that almost the same amount of coins flow
in and out of these addresses. This indicates that the money is
being distributed to other addresses, and is not stored on payment-
receiving addresses. One explanation for this behavior is that by
distributing funds to other addresses, a hidden service can reduce
coin traceability. Also, hidden services still need to distribute their
revenues among owners, sellers, and other stakeholders.
We also observed that multiple hidden services have a revenue
of more than 4K Bitcoins and up to 29.6K, where one Bitcoin was
valued at 19.7 thousand USD as of Dec, 2017. The Silk Road, for
example, has received more than 580 million USD on its address.
Lifetime. Tracking the economic activity of hidden services over
time allows us to estimate their operational lifetime, at least as seen
from their associated addresses. From the transaction history of
each hidden service, when filtered by its Bitcoin address, we define
the lifetime of the service as the difference between the timestamps
of the last and the first transactions involving the address. This
allows us to estimate the period of operation of each hidden service,
and accordingly, determine if the service is still active.
As summarized in Table 2, hidden services vary in their lifetime,
ranging from 2–6 years of operation. We note that the first transac-
tion date does not imply that the service began its operation on that
date; it indicates the date on which the service started receiving
Bitcoin payments. Looking at last transaction dates, most of the
hidden services are still active in 2017.
4 DISCUSSION
We now discuss the deanonymization attack, focusing on its fea-
sibility and implications. We also list the limitations of this work
and highlight a number of existing countermeasures for improved
privacy and anonymity.
4.1 Feasibility
Tor is expected to maintain its anonymity guarantees even with an
active, local adversary who controls a fraction of network resources,
20% of the routers, for example. The goal of such an adversary is
to link the source of a communication tunnel to its destination. In
our setting, this maps to linking a hidden service user to a hidden
service operator. By observing both ends of a circuit, even a passive
adversary can confirm a connection exists between Alice and Bob
using time and traffic analysis [14]. If the adversary controls only
a small fraction of the network, the chance of such an end-to-end
compromise is very small. However, side-channel attacks can be
used to increase the success rate of deanonymization attacks [2].
The results in Section 3.6 show that it is possible to deanonymize
hidden service users without the need to control network resources
nor inspect the traffic. As discussed in Section 3.2, we consider a pas-
sive, limited adversary that falls within the adversary model of Tor,
and focus on hidden services that use Bitcoin as a payment method.
Through a real-world experiment, we showed that an adversary
can link users, who publicly share their Bitcoin addresses on online
social networks, with hidden services, which publicly share their
Bitcoin addresses on onion landing pages. This is accomplished by
inspecting the transactions involving these two addresses in the
Blockchain.
While collecting Bitcoin addresses of hidden services, we found
that many services started to hide their payment Bitcoin addresses
from onion landing pages. One explanation of this trend is that
hidden service operators realized that publicly sharing Bitcoin ad-
dresses can leak information which could be used for linking and
improving traceability. Instead, these services let users register
accounts on their website and use them to perform transactions
without exposing the addresses used to receive Bitcoins. The way
this works is as follows: If Alice wants to perform a transaction
with a hidden service, she starts by creating a personal account on
the service. The hidden service creates and controls a new Bitcoin
address, from a new public/private key pair, to which Alice makes
a transaction from her personal Bitcoin addresses.
An active, more resourceful, local adversary can compile a larger
set of hidden service addresses by performing small transactions
with such services in order to reveal their addresses. Moreover,
adversaries can impersonate a hidden service and receive payments
on addresses they control. Deanonymization that exploit such tech-
niques has been practiced in the wild by governments to uncover
illegal hidden services [10]. The adversary can also map collected
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Bitcoin addresses to IP addresses in order to deanonymize users at
a more granular level [21].
In this work, due to ethical concerns, we simulated only a passive,
limited adversary. However, active, local adversaries that are well-
funded are likely to exist in practice. We note that the success rate
achieved by a passive, limited adversary represents a lower bound
of that of an active, local adversary.
4.2 Implications
The main security implication of our work is that a Bitcoin ad-
dresses can be exploited to deanonymize users. The experiment we
conducted can be extended to include other online social networks
and information sources. It is also likely that an online identity,
or a user account, on one social network has links to others net-
works that provide additional PIIs. Some users explicitly reveal
their name, age, nationality, and other information in their bio or
through posts. This represents a serious threat to their anonymity,
since the hidden services they engage with might be associated
with questionable transactions. The linking process can also be
used as a tool by third-parties to track users, perform surveillance,
and audit financial transactions.
Due to these security and privacy concerns, users have to fol-
low simple yet effective guidelines in order to protect themselves.
First, users should never expose their Bitcoin addresses along with
their personally identifiable information. Second, as discussed in
Satoshi’s white paper [29], a new address should be generated for
each transaction in order to reduce linkability of transactions, re-
gardless of whether the user is the sender or the receiver of the
payment. This is especially true for cases where users expose a
donation address on different kinds of online social networks. Un-
fortunately, a large number of users do not follow this practice,
possibly due to poor usability of Bitcoin tools, unfamiliarity of
Bitcoin internals, or reliance on third-party wallets and exchange
services [22].
4.3 Limitations
Ourwork has twomain limitations. First, in our analysis, we assume
that linking a user, represented as an online identity, to a hidden
service is sufficient to deanonymize the user. However, this is not
always true. Users can always create fake online identities in order
to hide their real ones. While doing so improves their anonymity,
once the links are established the adversary can perform online
surveillance to track down the users and uncover their true identi-
ties. The second limitation is related to the use of mixing services.
While the wallet-closure cleaning process we used eliminates the
effect of mixing, it is aggressive and can exclude users who did not
use mixing services at all. Accordingly, our results under estimates
the prevalence of the deanonymization threat.
It is important to mention that some of the linked users through
this analysis are not concerned about their transactions anonymity
to services such as Internet Archives. However, some users are
unconscious about protecting their privacy, and this type of analysis
can be used to incriminate these users. For example, services such
as The Pirate Bay are illegal in Sweden, and therefore, establishing
a link through a transactions with such a service could potentially
be used as an evidence to accuse the user of illegal activities.
Onemight argue that the number of deanonymized users is small.
However, in order to understand the significance of the results, it
is useful to put the numbers into perspective. According to recent
web statistics [31, 36], the number of worldwide Internet users is
around 3.58 billion and the number of Tor network users is about 3
million, which are a superset of Tor hidden service users. Thismeans
that 0.086% of Internet users are Tor network users, on average.
The datasets we collected include 45,153 Twitter and BitcoinTalk
users, out of which 0.277% of them were deanonymized. While this
percentage is larger than 0.086%, likely due to biased sampling, it is
still relatively small, as expected. In other words, because we do not
know how many of the users in the datasets are Tor hidden service
users, we should expect that only a small percentage of them can
be deanonymized.
4.4 Countermeasures
There are two general ways to achieve improved anonymity for
users and hidden services. The first one is operational, and it focuses
on following Bitcoin best practices, as discussed in Section 4.2. For
those users who can be linked, the best course of action for them
is to clean their social network footprint, focusing on removing
PII that is publicly shared or deleting their linked online identities,
all together. The second way to improve anonymity is technical,
and it involves improvements to the current Bitcoin protocol or the
introduction of new crypto-currencies that are based on Bitcoin’s
Blockchain technology.
Second generation anonymization techniques, such as CoinJoin,
Fair Exchange [18], CoinSwap, and stealth addresses have been
proposed to be implemented as extensions or services for Bitcoin’s
original protocol. These are discussed in details in [28]. Furthermore,
other alternative coins based on different modifications to Bitcoin
protocol have been introduced to provide additional anonymity
for transactions on the Blockchain. The most prominent of them
beingMonero, which is based on Crypto Note v2.0 protocol [34] and
Zcash [35]. In fact, Monero is alreadymaking its way into the hidden
services of the Dark Web [37]. These new coins aim to deliver full
anonymity of transactions, and have their own advantages and
disadvantages compared to Bitcoin.
5 RELATEDWORK
There are a number of studies that investigate user anonymity and
privacy concerns in Bitcoin [15, 16, 25, 32]. Fergal and Martin [32]
demonstrated that using passive analysis of publicly-available Bit-
coin information can lead to a serious information leakage. They
constructed two networks representing transactions and users from
the Blockchain. Integrating these networks with off-network infor-
mation, such as user profiles from online social networks, and con-
text discovery and flow analysis techniques, it was possible to study
the flow of Bitcoins between addresses and investigate thefts. Fleder
et al. [16], on the other hand, explored the level of anonymity in the
Bitcoin network. The authors annotated the transaction graph by
linking user pseudonyms to online identities collected from online
social networks. They also developed a graph-analysis framework
to summarize and cluster the activity of users. The analysis links
identities of users to their transactions. These studies form the base
for our approach, as we use some of their techniques in our analysis.
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The difference in our study is that we target a specific portion of
Bitcoin users, which are Tor hidden service users. We also study the
economic activities of linked hidden services, which is important
to understand the level of threat the users are exposed to.
DuPont and Squicciarini [15] proposed a technique to determine
a Bitcoin user’s physical location by examining user spending habits
and linking it to the user’s time zone. Androulaki et al. [1] studied
the privacy provisions in Bitcoin through a simulation mimicking
the use of Bitcoin as the digital currency for daily transactions in
a typical university setting. The study shows that behavior-based
clustering can unveil the profiles of 40% of Bitcoin users even if
they are using recommended privacy measures. This method can
be used with our techniques to increase the deanonymization level
from an online identity to a physical identity.
A recent study by Harrigan and Fretter [17] showed the effective-
ness of address clustering using the Blockchain of Bitcoin. These
clusters are constructed using different heuristics such as the one
we used in our study. The authors performed address clustering on
the entire Bitcoin’s Blockchain and showed that despite the exis-
tence of CoinJoin and mixed transactions, address clustering is still
suitable for Blockchain analysis and re-identification attacks. The
findings presented in their work strengthen our analysis results
and further proves that our linking to hidden services is still valid
until the current time.
6 CONCLUSION
We show that using Bitcoin as a payment method for Tor hidden ser-
vices leaks information that can be used to deanonymize their users.
This represents a serious threat to these users, because they actively
seek to maintain their anonymity by using Tor. The deanonymiza-
tion is mainly due to the lack of retroactive operational security
present in Bitcoin’s pseudonymity model. In particular, by inspect-
ing historical transactions in the Blockchain, an adversary can link
users, who publicly share their Bitcoin addresses on online social
networks, with hidden services, which publicly share their Bitcoin
addresses on their onion landing pages.
In a real-world experiment, we were able to link many users
of Twitter and the BitcoinTalk forum to various hidden services,
including WikiLeaks, Silk Road, and The Pirate Bay. Using informa-
tion from their public user profiles, we were able to show concrete
case studies where the anonymity of the users is broken. Our results
has one immediate implication: Bitcoin addresses should always be
assumed compromised as they can be used to deanonymize users.
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A APPENDIX
In what follows, we present a high-level analysis of the economic ac-
tivity involving all hidden services from the hiddenServices dataset.
A.1 Volume
Figure 2 shows the CDF of the total volume from all services, as
defined in Section 3.6.3. We can see from the figure that 10% or less
hidden services had more than 1,000 transactions. This complies
with our previous results showing that most of the transactions
from twitterUsers and forumUsers datasets were attributed to the
top 4–5 hidden services, in terms of volume.
A.2 Money Flow
The money flowing in and out of hidden service addresses is almost
identical, so is the corresponding money flow CDFs. Figure 3 shows
the CDF of the total incoming Bitcoins received by all services. As
the figure shows, only the top 10% of hidden services had received
more than 100B. The distribution is relatively skewed due to the
fact that the top-3 services had significantly bigger revenue, with
more than 4,000B.
A.3 Lifetime
Figure 4 shows the percentage of hidden services that were active
during the period 2011–2017. As denoted by the figure, most of these
services were active during the years 2014–2015, which is the same
time frame we based our data collection period on. Furthermore, as
expected, the activity for their addresses is significantly lower in
the following years. This is most likely due to the usage of online
wallets or their migration to other cryptocurrencies, as discussed
in Section 4.
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